Politics by other means

Donald Rumsfeld knew he had a problem. It wasn't how to take Iraq; it was how to control the US army. He knew that there are two types of army. The large hierarchical state armies that project power through equipment, systems and organisation. And the small racially cohesive units, that are agile and can follow political objectives.

An army, or a a state force that Clausewitz would recognise, is only controllable by the military and follow military rules. And that is why Rumsfeld wanted to remake it into the second type of army that he could control. He couldn't do anything about cohesion, but he knew he could do business with about 75,000 troops. The US Army wanted to send 400,000.

Rumsfeld will be remembered as the the man who didn't plan for what to do after Iraq was "captured":

One of Secretary Rumsfeld's close associates was telling me, quite passionately, that Rumsfeld axiomatically is against predictions and expectations. Life is uncertain and that's fine. But when he comes to drawing up plans for running a country, it's hard to have quite this existentialist view. Existentialism is fine as a personal philosophy. But if you're running a nation's occupation, it can lead to problems.

The large state army still works, witness Russia slapping down Georgia when it tried to push its luck, but this is now the exception.

After Gaza, it is clearly obvious which way things will go in the future. Gaza was bloody because two modern style small armies were prepared to go head to head. As Hamas were by definition surrounded before they had even started, the result was not at issue - even if the forces had been balanced.

The Israeli army, or IDF, is not really a military force - it is almost totally political. They had no, and didn't need any, achievable military objectives. (Stopping your neighbours sticking two fingers up at you is not a valid military objective). But the Israeli racial distrust of their enemy allowed them to ignore the rules of fair war and just put fire down where it would have most graphic effect.

Of course, Israel were trying to punish Palestinians. In Israeli eyes, it is they who voted for Hamas - and thus all Gazans were valid targets. And a political tool can be used to instill fear, in order to destabilize a regime. Hence killing a few children here, using a little white phosphorus there and hitting UN schools for kicks sent the required message - nowhere is safe; if you tolerate Hamas your children will be next. These are not the actions of regular disciplined forces.

Successful armies are now more likely to be sectarian in nature, because with a reasonable cost base they can do a lot of damage, and easily hold their own against bigger slower forces. But much more importantly they can take direct political direction - as long as its correctly dressed up. What if you don't have a small racially cohesive pack of war dogs? Don't worry - use someone elses! A proxy war is still a good war.